Abstract-Training machine learning (ML) models is expensive in terms of computational power, large amounts of labeled data, and human expertise. Thus, ML models constitute intellectual property (IP) and business value for their owners. Embedding digital watermarks during model training allows a model owner to later identify their models in case of theft or misuse. However, model functionality can also be stolen via model extraction, where an adversary trains a surrogate model using results returned from a prediction API of the original model. Recent work has shown that model extraction is a realistic threat. Existing watermarking schemes are ineffective against IP theft via model extraction since it is the adversary who trains the surrogate model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent progress in machine learning (ML) has led to a dramatic surge in the use of ML models for a wide variety of applications. Major enterprises like Google, Apple, and Facebook have already deployed ML models in their products [1] . ML-related businesses are expected to generate trillions of dollars in revenue in the near future [2] . The process of collecting training data and training ML models is the basis of the business advantage, and thus the revenue potential, underlying these businesses. Hence, protecting the intellectual property (IP) embodied in ML models is necessary to preserve the business advantage of model owners.
One approach for IP protection of ML models is watermarking. Several recent works [3] - [5] have shown how digital watermarks can be embedded into deep neural network models (DNNs) during training. Watermarks consist of a set of inputs, the trigger set, with incorrect labels assigned to them. A legitimate model owner can use the trigger set, along with a large training set with correct labels, to train a watermarked model and distribute it to his customers. If he later encounters a model he suspects to be a copy of his own, he can demonstrate ownership by using the trigger set as inputs to the suspected model. These watermarking schemes thus allow legitimate model owners to detect subsequent theft or misuse of their models.
Instead of distributing ML models to customers, an increasingly popular alternative business paradigm is to allow customers to use models via prediction APIs. But one can mount a model extraction [6] attack via such APIs by sending a sequence of API queries with different inputs and using the resulting predictions to train a surrogate model with similar functionality as the queried model. Model extraction attacks are effective even against complex DNN models [7] , [8] , and are difficult to prevent [7] . Existing watermarking techniques, which rely on model owners to embed watermarks during training, are completely ineffective against model extraction since it is the adversary who trains the surrogate model.
In this paper we introduce DAWN (Dynamic Adversarial Watermarking of Neural Networks), a new watermarking approach intended to deter IP theft via model extraction. DAWN is designed to be deployed within the prediction API of a model. It dynamically watermarks a tiny fraction of queries from a client by changing the prediction responses for them. The watermarked queries serve as the trigger set if an adversarial client trains a surrogate model using the responses to its queries. The model owner can use the trigger set to demonstrate IP ownership of the extracted surrogate model as in prior DNN watermarking solutions [4] , [5] . However, DAWN differs from them in that it is the adversary (model thief), rather than the defender (original owner) who trains the watermarked model. This raises two new challenges: (1) defenders must choose trigger sets from among queries sent by clients and cannot choose optimal trigger sets from the whole input space; (2) adversaries can select the training data or manipulate the training process to resist the embedding of watermarks. DAWN addresses both these challenges.
DAWN watermarks are client-specific: DAWN not only infers whether a given model is a surrogate, but, in case of model extraction, also identifies the client whose queries were used to train the surrogate. DAWN is parametrized so that changed predictions needed for watermarking are sufficiently rare as to not degrade the utility of the original model for legitimate API clients. We make the following contributions:
• present DAWN, the first approach for dynamic, selective watermarking for DNN models at their prediction APIs for deterring IP theft via model extraction (Sect. IV), • empirically assess it (Sect. V) using several DNN models and datasets showing that DAWN is robust to adversarial manipulations and resilient to evasion (Sect. VI), and • show that DAWN watermarking is resistant to two state-of-the-art extraction attacks, reliably demonstrating ownership (with confidence >1 − 2 64 ) while having a negligible impact on model utility (0.03-0.5% decrease in accuracy) (Sect. VII).
II. BACKGROUND

A. Deep Neural Network
In this paper, we focus on deep neural networks (DNNs). A DNN is a function F : R n → R m , where n is the number of input features and m is the number of output classes of the model in a classification task. F (x) is a vector of length m containing probabilities p j that x belongs to each class c j ∈ C for j ∈ {1, m}. The final prediction class, denoted F (x), is obtained by applying the argmax function:F (x) = argmax(F (x)) = c. A DNN model F is trained such that F (x) approximates a perfect oracle function O f : R n → C which gives the true class c for any sample x ∈ R n . If F is successfully trained, we haveF ∼ O f and the accuracy of F is close to 1: Acc(F ) = 1 − where refers to the irreducible error.
B. Model Extraction Attacks
In model extraction [6] - [10] , an adversary A wants to "steal" a DNN model F V of a victim V by making a series of prediction requests U to F V and obtaining predictions F V (U ). U and F V (U ) are used by A to train a surrogate model F A . A's goal is to have Acc(F A ) as close as possible to Acc(F V ).
All model extraction attacks [6] - [10] operate in a blackbox setting: A has access to a prediction API, A uses the set < U, F V (U ) > to iteratively refine the accuracy of F A . Depending on the adversary model, A's capabilities can be divided into three categories: model knowledge, data access, querying strategy.
Model knowledge. A does not know the exact architecture of F V or the hyperparameters or the training process. However, given the purpose of the API (e.g., image recognition) and expected complexity of the task, A may attempt to guess the architecture of the model [7] , [9] . On the other hand, if F V is complex, A can use publicly available, high capacity model pre-trained with a very large benchmark datasets [8] . While the above methods focus on DNNs, there exist alternatives [6] that target simple models: logistic regression, decision trees, shallow neural networks.
Data access. A's main limitation is the lack of access to natural data that comes from the same distribution as the data used to train F V . A may use data that comes from the same domain as victim's dataset but from a different distribution [10] . If A does not exactly know the distribution or the domain, it may use widely available natural data [8] to mount the attack. Alternatively, it may use only synthetic samples [6] or a mix of small number of natural samples augmented by synthetic samples [7] , [9] .
Querying strategy. All model stealing attacks [6] - [10] consist of alternating phases of A querying F V , followed by training the surrogate model F A using the obtained predictions. A queries F V with all its data and then trains the surrogate model [8] , [10] . Alternatively, if A relies primarily on synthetic data [7] , [9] , it deliberately crafts inputs that would help it train F A .
C. Watermarking DNN models
Digital watermarking is a technique used to covertly embed a marker, the watermark, in an object (image, audio, etc.) which can be used to demonstrate ownership of the object. Watermarking of DNN models leverages the massive overcapacity of these models and their ability to fit data with arbitrary labels [11] . DNNs have a large number of parameters, many of which have little significance for their primary classification task. These parameters can be used to carry additional information beyond what is required for its primary classification task. This property is exploited by backdooring attacks, which consist in training a DNN model that deliberately outputs incorrect predictions for some selected inputs [12] , [13] .
Watermarking of DNN models is currently based on backdooring attacks [3] - [5] , [14] . Assume that we want to train a DNN model F for which the primary task is to approximate an oracle O f : R n → C. Embedding a watermark in F consists of enabling F with a secondary classification task: for a subset of samples x ∈ T ⊂ R n , we wantF to output incorrect prediction classes as defined by a function B :
We call B(x) a backdoor function and T a trigger set: T triggers the backdoor. F is trained using the trigger set T mislabeled usingB(x) in addition to a larger set of samples x ∈ R n \ T accurately labeled using O f (x). F is a watermarked DNN model which is expected to approximate the backdoor function B(x) for x ∈ T and the oracle O f for x ∈ R n \ T . The trigger set T and the outputs of the backdoor function for its elementsB(T ) compose the watermark: (T,B(T )). Let F be a DNN model that copies F . The watermark can be used to demonstrate ownership of F . It only requires F to expose a prediction API which can be used to query all samples in the trigger set x ∈ T . If we obtain a sufficient number of predictionsF (x) such thatF (x) =B(x), this demonstrates that F is a copy of the watermarked model F .
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we set out the goals and requirements for a watermarking techniques intended to deter model extraction attacks. Recall in this setting, unlike in prior watermarking schemes [3] - [5] , [14] , the defender does not control the training process of the watermarked (surrogate) model and cannot freely choose the trigger set.
A. Adversary Model
The goal of the adversary A is to perform a model extraction attack against a victim model F V using queries to its prediction API. The goal of the attack is model functionality stealing [8] .
A wants to train a surrogate model F A that performs well on a classification task for which F V was designed. IfF V ∼ O f then A's goal is thatF A ∼ O f , which can be considered successful if Acc(F A ) ∼ Acc(F V ). A secondary goal is to minimize the number of queries to F V necessary for A to train F A .
To achieve this goal, A has full control over the samples D A it chooses to query F V with. These can be natural [8] or synthetic samples [6] , [7] , [9] . A obtains a prediction for each query in the form of probability vectors F V (x) or single classesF V (x), ∀x ∈ D A . A uses queried samples and their predictions to train F A , a DNN. It chooses the DNN model architecture, training hyperparameters and training process. Requiring F A to be a DNN is justified by the observations in prior work on model extraction attacks [7] - [9] that a surrogate model F A needs to have equal or larger capacity than the victim model F V in order for model extraction to be successful. DNNs have the greatest capacity among ML models [11] .
B. Assumption
We assume that for a given input x ∈ D A , A has no a priori expectation regarding the prediction F V (x). A treats y = F V (x) as the ground truth label for x ∈ D A . A expects that multiple queries of the same input x must return the same prediction y.
C. DAWN Goals and Overview
On one hand, model extraction attacks against DNNs have been proven difficult to defend against [7] . On the other hand, existing watermarking techniques [3] , [4] , [14] are vulnerable to model extraction attacks [5] . To address these limitations, we design a solution to identify and prove the ownership of DNN models stolen through a prediction API.
Our solution, DAWN (Dynamic Adversarial Watermarking of Neural networks), is an additional component deployed in front of a model prediction API as depicted in Fig. 1 . DAWN dynamically embeds a watermark in responses to queries made by an API client. This watermark is composed of inputs x i ∈ T for which we return incorrect predictions B(
A uses all the responses including these mislabeled samples (x i , B(x i )) to train F A . F A will remember those samples as a backdoor [12] that represents the watermark (as in traditional DNN watermarking techniques). If F A exposes a public prediction API, a judge J can run a verification process (verify), which confirms F A is a surrogate of F V . Verify checks that for sufficient number of inputs
The sole goal of DAWN is to embed a watermark into any model that is trained using responses from F V . This is different from prior work where the goal is to (a) degrade model accuracy (typical of poisoning attacks [15] , [16] embed a watermark and maximize model accuracy (typical of traditional DNN watermarking [3] , [4] ) or (c) trigger a targeted misclassification (typical to backdooring [17] ). DAWN can choose any class c =F V (x) for incorrect predictions while in backdooring, A wants x to be classified as a targeted class c j .
The main challenge, in contrast to traditional DNN watermarking, is that V neither controls the training process of the model that will embed the watermark (F A ) nor it chooses the inputs to carry the watermark from the whole input space R n . This choice is limited to the set of samples D A submitted by A. The goal of the defender (V) is to embed a watermark within the responses to a subset of queries it receives so that any surrogate model trained using these responses will retain the watermark.
D. System requirements
We define the following requirements for the watermark that DAWN embeds in F A during an extraction attack. W1-W3 were introduced in [4] while W4 is a new requirement specific to DAWN. W1 Unremovability: A is unable to remove the watermark from F A without significantly decreasing its accuracy making it "unusable": Acc(F A ) Acc(F V ). W2 Reliability: Given a purported watermark (T,B(T )) for a model F , if J 's verification procedure verify outputs "true", F is a surrogate model with high confidence. On the other hand, if F is not a surrogate, A cannot generate a watermark (T,B(T )) such that verify outputs "true" (non-trivial ownership). W3 Non-ownership piracy: A cannot produce a watermark for a model that was already watermarked by V, such that it can cast V's ownership into doubt.
W4 Linkability: If verify outputs "true" for a surrogate model F A , the watermark used for verification (T,B(T )) can be linked to a specific API client whose queries were used to train F A . In addition, we define the following requirements for the defense to extraction attacks provided by DAWN: X1 Utility: Incorrect predictions returned by DAWN do not significantly degrade the prediction service provided to legitimate API clients: Acc(DAWN + F V ) ∼ Acc(F V ). X2 Indistinguishability: Incorrect predictions B(x) are not distinguishable by A from correct victim model predictions F V (x). X3 Collusion resistance: Watermark unremovability (W1), linkability (W4) and indistinguishability (X2) must remain valid even if the extraction attack is distributed among several API clients. In contrast to traditional DNN watermarking, DAWN does not aim at maximizing the accuracy of the watermarked model Acc(F A ) on a primary classification task.
IV. DYNAMIC ADVERSARIAL WATERMARKING
We first present the method for generating and embedding an adversarial watermark. Then we describe the process for proving ownership of a model using the watermark.
A. Watermark generation
We define watermarking an input x as returning an incorrect prediction B V (x) instead of the correct prediction F V (x). The collection of all watermarked inputs composes the trigger set T A that will be a backdoor to a surrogate model trained using responses from F V including T A . As follows, inputs x ∈ T A and their corresponding prediction classesB V (x) compose the watermark to the surrogate model (T A ,B V (T A )).
We define two functions:
• W V (x) that decides to watermark an input or not.
• B V (x) the backdoor function returning incorrect predictions. A must not be able to predict the output of W V , or distinguish between B V (x) and F V (x). The same query, regardless of the API client, must always get the same output. Both functions must be deterministic random functions specific to F V to fulfill these properties.
We use the result of a keyed cryptographic hash function as a source for randomness. We compute HMAC(K w , x) using SHA-256, where K w is a model-specific secret key generated by DAWN and x is an input to F V . If x is a matrix of dimension d > 1, it is flattened to a 1-dimensional vector. The result of the hash is split in two parts HMAC(K w , x)[0, 127] and HMAC(K w , x) [128, 255] , respectively used in W V and B V . These two 128-bits numbers are independent and provide a sufficient source for randomness for each function.
1) Watermarking decision: W V (x) is a boolean function. We define r w as the fraction of inputs that we want to be watermarked out of N inputs submitted by an API client. r w will define the size of the trigger set |T A | = r w × N . W V is computed as follows.
The expectation that W V returns 1 and thus to watermark a sample is uniformly equal to r w . It is worth noting that DAWN does not differentiate adversaries from benign API clients. Consequently, any API client obtains a rate r w of incorrect predictions. r w must be defined to meet a trade-off. A large r w increases the reliability of ownership demonstration and prevents trivial ownership demonstration W2 as later discussed in Sect. IV-C. A small r w maximizes utility X1 by minimizing the number of incorrect predictions returned to benign API clients.
2) Backdoor function: We implement the backdoor function B V (x) as a function of F V (x). Our motivations are two-fold. First, this allows for deploying DAWN to protect any model F V with minimal modifications. Second, it makes B V (x) consistent with correct predictions F V (x). We define
is a keyed pseudo-random permutation function with secret key K π . Even if an adversary uncovers values B V (x) for a large number of inputs, it will not be able to infer the function B V . This prevents an adversary from recovering
does not need to permute all m positions of F V (x) but only those with highest probabilities for the purpose of backdooring. A large number of classes typically have a 0 probability value when m is large. Considering that the number of positions to permute is small, we use the Fisher-Yates shuffle algorithm [18] to implement π. We use K π = HMAC(K w , x) [128, 255] as the key that determines the permutations performed during the Fisher-Yates shuffle algorithm. A 128-bits key allows for list permutation of up to 34 positions (34 prediction probabilities) in a secure manner.
3) Indistinguishability: Outputs B V (x) must be indistinguishable from F V (x) X2. This requirement is partially addressed by our assumption that A has no expectation regarding predictions obtained from F V (Sect. III-B). Nevertheless, our watermarking function W V is conditioned by a hash value of the input x. A subtle modification δ to x produces a different hash and consequently a different result W V (x) = W V (x + δ). Whenever A observes B(x) F V (x + δ) for a small δ, it can discard x from its training set to defeat DAWN.
Therefore we assume that A expects two similar inputs x and x + δ to have similar predictions F V (x) ∼ F V (x + δ) when δ is small. This expectation diminishes as δ increases, as shown by the existence of adversarial samples to DNNs [19] . Adversarial samples are inputs x = x + δ such thatF (x) = F (x ) with δ upper bounded. To enhance indistinguishability, we now describe a consistent watermarking decision W V (x) = W V (x + δ) for an upper bounded δ.
We define a secret mapping function M V : R n → R p that projects x to a space of lower dimension p < n. The mapping M V (x) is only used as the new input to our hash function such that HMAC(
This smoothens the decision of W V which returns the same result W V (x) = W V (x + δ) for similar inputs. It also ensures that permutations π performed in B V will be the same for similar inputs (π is keyed by the hash result).
M V is specific to the input type and to the classification task of F V (x). For image classification, M V can be a masking and binning function. This solution has been proposed as a certified defense against adversarial samples [20] . A mask of size q × q is first sequentially applied to x and averages pixel values. These resulting values are then binned to be represented on r < 8 bits [0, 2 r ] instead of 8 original bits [0, 255]. M V mitigates large modifications of a single pixel value (with masking) and small modifications of a large number of pixels (with binning). The value of q and r define the sensitivity of M V to adversarial modifications and set an upper bound on δ for which we have M V (x) = M V (x + δ).
B. Watermark embedding
A uses the set of inputs D A and the corresponding predictions returned by DAWN-protected prediction API of
Given that F A has enough capacity (large enough number of parameters), it will be able to remember a certain amount of training data having arbitrarily incorrect labels [11] . This phenomenon is called overfitting and it can be prevented using regularization [21] . But it is not effective for DNNs with a large capacity [11] . This is the rationale for the existence of DNN backdoors [17] and for DAWN. We expect our watermark (T A ,B V (T A )) to be embedded as a backdoor in F A as a natural effect of training a model F A with high capacity. If the watermark is not embedded, we expect F A 's accuracy on the primary task to be too low to make it usable (W1).
Different adversaries A i will have different datasets D Ai . Consequently the trigger sets T Ai selected by DAWN will also be different. Different surrogate models F Ai will embed different watermarks. Each watermark thus links to the API client identifier. DAWN meets the linkability requirement W4.
C. Watermark verification
We present the verify function used by J to prove a model F is a surrogate of F . Verify tests if a given watermark (T,B(T )) is embedded in a model F suspected to be a surrogate of F . We first define L(T,B(T ), F ) that computes the ratio of different results between the backdoor function B(x) and the suspected surrogate modelF (x) for all inputs in the trigger set.
The watermark verification succeeds, i.e., verify returns "true", if and only if L(T,B(T ), F ) < e, where e is a tolerated error rate that must be defined. This means we must have at most e × |T | samples whereB(x) andF (x) differ in order to declare F is a surrogate of F . The choice for the value of e is a trade-off between correctness and completeness for watermark verification (reliability W2). Assume we want to use a pre-generated watermark (T,B(T )) to verify if an arbitrary model F is a surrogate. For simplicity, we assume a uniform probability of matching the prediction of a watermarked input P (B(x) =F (x)) = 1/m, where m is the number of classes of F . The probability for trivial watermark verification success, given a trigger set of size |T | and an error rate e, can be computed using the cumulative binomial distribution function as follows.
This probability is the average success rate of A wanting to frame V for model stealing using an arbitrary watermark. Figure 2 depicts the decrease of this success rate as we increase the watermark size. We see that the verification function can accommodate a large error rate (e > 0.5) while preventing trivial success in verification using a small watermark (|T | ≈ 50). The error rate e must be defined proportionally to the number of classes m. Large error rates can be used for models with a large number of classes. For instance, we can set e = 0.8 for a model with m = 256 classes, limiting the adversary success rate to less than 2 −64 for a watermark of size 70. The success rate in trivial verification is the complement to the confidence for reliable watermark verification, and for reliable demonstration of ownership by transition 1 − P (L < e). The choice of e defines the minimum watermark size given a targeted confidence. Recall that this size must also be small to ensure utility of the model to protect X1. The tolerated error must necessarily be lower than the probability of random class match: e < (1 − m)/m. Also, e must be larger than where Acc(F A ) = 1− is the accuracy of the watermarked surrogate model F A on the trigger set.
The success of watermark verification is not sufficient to declare ownership of a surrogate model F . A can increase its success in trivial watermark verification from random using several means. For instance, knowing F and F , A can find inputs x for which F (x) = F (x) and use pairs (x, F (x)) as a watermark that would successfully pass watermark verification. Thus demonstrating ownership requires a careful process to ensure that the probability for matching an incorrect prediction class remains random, ensuring that the probability for trivial watermark verification follows Eq. 3.
D. Demonstrating ownership
We present the process for a model owner V to demonstrate ownership of a surrogate model watermarked by DAWN. It only requires the suspected surrogate model F A to expose a prediction API. This process uses a judge J who is trusted to (a) ensure confidentiality of all data submitted as input to the process and (b) correctly execute and report the results of the specified verify. It also uses a time-stamped public bulletin board, e.g., a blockchain, in which information can be published to provide proof of anteriority. J can be implemented using an trusted execution environment (TEE) [22] .
1) Watermark registration: V must publish cryptographic commitments of the following elements in the time-stamped public bulletin board:
The commitment can be instantiated using a cryptographic hash function H(), e.g., SHA-3. Each watermark should be linked to the corresponding model, e.g., by associating H(F V ) with each registered watermark.
Several updated versions of the registered watermark can be published for each API client, as they make more queries to the prediction API and their watermarks grow. The verification of any one of these watermarks is sufficient to demonstrate ownership of the model.
We define the following rules for reliable demonstration of ownership W2 that prevents ownership piracy W3:
• in case of contention, the model having its commitment first published is deemed to be the original.
2) Verification process: When V suspects a model F A is a surrogate of F V trained by an API client i, it provides a pointer to the prediction API of F A to J . It also provides the following secret information using a confidential communication channel: the API client i watermark (T Ai ,B V (T Ai )) and F V .
J does the following to check if F A is a surrogate of F V . If any step fails, the ownership of F A is not considered to have been demonstrated. If all succeed, J gives the verdict that F A is a surrogate of F V .
1) compute H(T Ai ,B V (T Ai )) and use it as a pointer to retrieve the registered watermark
is extracted from the registered watermark. 3) retrieve H(F V ) from the public bulletin and verify it was published before
If F A 's owner (A) wants to contest the verdict, it must provide the original model F A to J using a confidential communication channel. J assesses that the provided model and the API model are the same F A = F A by verifying F A (x) = F A (x), ∀x ∈ T Ai . Then, J computes H(F A ) and retrieves it from the public bulletin. If H(F A ) was published before H(F V ), J concludes that F A = F A is an original model.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Datasets and Models 1) Datasets: We evaluate DAWN with four image recognition datasets that were used in prior work to evaluate DNN extraction attacks. MNIST [23] and GTSRB [24] are respectively a handwritten-digit and traffic-sign dataset used to showcase the extraction of low capacity DNN models [7] , [9] . CIFAR10 [25] and Caltech256 [26] are composed of various images depicting miscellaneous objects that were used to showcase the extraction of high capacity DNN models [8] , [10] . These datasets are divided into a training and a testing set and their characteristics are detailed in Tab. I. Images were resized to fit the corresponding model architectures used in prior work and further described in Sect. V-A2.
We selected a random subset of 100,000 samples from ImageNet dataset [27] , which contains images of natural and man-made objects. This dataset contains out-of-distribution samples with respect to the other datasets. We use it to evaluate the embedding of different types of watermarks and to perform a particular model extraction attack that requires such out-ofdistribution samples [8] .
2) Models: We select two kinds of DNN models to evaluate the embedding of a watermark: low-capacity models having less than 10 layers, and high-capacity models having over 20 layers. In order to accurately reconstruct model extraction attacks, we use the same model architectures and training process as in [7] for low-capacity models and as in [8] for high-capacity models. The exact number of layers and parameters are presented in Table II . We trained MNIST-5L and GTSRB-5L models as described in [7] . We trained an additional CIFAR10-9L model, not evaluated in [7] , following a similar procedure.
Similarly to prior work [8] , we use ResNet34 [28] architecture pre-trained on ImageNet as a basis for highcapacity models. We fine-tuned a Caltech-RN34 model using the Caltech256 dataset as it was done in [8] . We trained additional GTSRB-RN34 and CIFAR10-RN34 models using the same procedure. It is worth noting that we also trained DenseNet121 [29] models to perform additional experiments due to the absence of dropout layers in ResNet34 models. All models were trained using Adam optimizer with learning rate of 0.001 that was decreased over time to 0.0005 (after 100 epochs for ResNet34 models and half-way for the other), except for Caltech-RN34. For Caltech-RN34, we used SGD optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.1 that was decreased by a factor of 10 every 60 epochs over 250 epochs. We used a batch size of 16 for fine-tuning Resnet34 and DenseNet121 based models.
We chose to reproduce only the Caltech-RN34 experiment from [8] because of its best performance. We used CIFAR10 and GTSRB to conduct supplementary experiments with high capacity models as they allow us to juxtapose results of experiments with low and high capacity models on the same datasets. 
B. Watermarking Procedure
Inputs from A's dataset D A are submitted to the DAWNenhanced prediction API of F V which returns correct F V (x) or incorrect predictions B V (x) according to the result of the watermarking function W V (x). We simulate A who uses the whole set D A , which includes |T A | samples with incorrect labels, to train its surrogate model F A . A trains F A without being aware of the watermarked samples in D A .
C. Evaluation Metrics
We use two metrics to evaluate the success of A's goal and V's goal respectively. A's goal is to train a surrogate model F A that has maximum accuracy on F V 's primary classification task. We evaluate this by computing the test accuracy of the surrogate model Acc test (F A ) on the test set T est of each dataset we use for evaluation (cf. Tab. I).
) V's goal is to maximize the embedding of the watermark in any surrogate model built from responses from F V such that its surrogacy can be reliably demonstrated. We evaluate this by computing the watermark accuracy of the surrogate model Acc wm (F A ) on the trigger set T A of watermarked inputs.
DAWN aims to maximize Acc wm (F A ) regardless of the test accuracy Acc test (F A ). A aims to maximize test accuracy while minimizing the watermark accuracy. In our experiments, we calculate both metrics every 5 epochs in order to evaluate their progress during the training process.
VI. ROBUSTNESS OF WATERMARKING
We assess A's ability to prevent the embedding of a watermark in a surrogate model, i.e., to violate the unremovability requirement W1. Prior work evaluated the unremovability of backoor-based watermark after a watermarked model is trained [3] - [5] . We focus on adversarial manipulations during training by evaluating several solutions that could prevent watermark embedding. We then evaluate the ability for A to identify watermarked inputs using the trained surrogate model, i.e., to violate the indistinguishability requirement X2.
We take an ideal model extraction attack scenario wherê F V = O f is a perfect oracle. A has access to a large dataset D A of natural samples from the same distribution as V training data. We use a large watermark of fixed size |T A | = 250 in all following experiments.
A. Unremovability of watermark during training
We evaluate the impact of two parameters on embedding a watermark during DNN training. The first parameter is the capacity of F A . A can limit this capacity such that the model could only learn the primary classification task and cannot learn the watermark. The second parameter is the use of regularization. Regularization accommodates classification errors on the training data, which is considered as noise. The watermark consists of incorrectly labeled inputs which may be considered as noise during training and discarded using regularization.
We evaluate the impact of model capacity and regularization on watermark accuracy Acc wm and test accuracy Acc test of F A . We trained several surrogate models with low and high capacity. The trigger set T A is randomly selected from the training set (MNIST, GTSRB, CIFAR, Caltech). We used plain training and two regularization methods, namely weight decay [30] with decaying factor λ and dropout (DO=X) [31] with probability X={0.3, 0.5}. We selected λ values optimal for A such that they maximize the difference Acc test −Acc wm . Table IIIa and IIIb present the results of this experiment for DNN models with low and high capacity respectively. We report Acc wm and Acc test results at three training stages providing (1) best watermark accuracy (best for V), (2) best test accuracy (best for A) and (3) when training is completed. Overall, we observe that test and watermark accuracy are high for most settings. Using plain training, the watermark accuracy is mostly higher than the test accuracy and often close to 100%. The ownership of all these surrogate models can be reliably demonstrated using a low tolerated error rate, e.g., e = 0.3. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of Acc wm , Acc test and training loss during the training of some selected surrogate models. Using plain training, we see that watermark and test accuracy are closely tied and Acc wm is usually slightly higher than Acc test . It is also worth noting that training a watermarked model is slower than training a plain model. Training an accurate watermarked MNIST-5L model requires 100 epochs while training the same model without watermark requires 10 epochs (cf. Tab. II).
1) Model capacity: High-capacity models can provide higher watermark and test accuracy than low-capacity models as highlighted by comparing results for GTSRB and CIFAR10 in both tables. While watermark accuracy is low for some low-capacity models, e.g., MNIST-3L, MNIST-5L (DO), their test accuracy is similarly low and close to random Acc wm ∼ Acc test ∼ 10%. This shows that reducing the model capacity can prevent the embedding of the watermark. However, decreasing the watermark accuracy to a level where it cannot be used to reliably prove ownership makes F A unusable. Watermark and test accuracy are closely tied when manipulating the model capacity and thus this is not a useful strategy to circumvent DAWN.
2) Regularization: Regularization is useful for decreasing the watermark accuracy in a few cases. Weight decay is useful for low-capacity GTSRB-5L and CIFAR10-9L models. Dropout is useful for low-capacity MNIST-5L and CIFAR10-9L models, and for high-capacity Caltech-DN121 model. Dropout completely prevents the embedding of the watermark into MNIST-5L model as depicted by Acc wm ∼ 10%. However, the test accuracy is also significantly reduced, by 50% at best, making F A potentially unusable. Figure 3 (MNIST-5L (DO=0.3)) further highlights that the maximal test accuracy of 51% is difficult to obtain since Acc test is very unstable along the training process, changing abruptly from 10% to 50% while the training loss remains constantly low. In all remaining cases, the watermark accuracy is reduced down to 20-35%, while preserving high test accuracy similar to models trained with non-watermarked datasets. While Acc wm is low, the watermark can still successfully demonstrate ownership 0  100  200  300  400  500  0  25  50  75  100  125  MNIST-5L   0  100  200  300  400  500  0  25  50  75  100  125 MNIST-5L (DO=0. by increasing the tolerated error rate to, e.g., e = 0.8 > 1 − Acc wm . Considering the large watermark size of 250, this demonstration would still be reliable despite the high tolerated error rate as evaluated in Sect. IV-C.
It is worth noting that no regularization method is effective at removing the watermark from high capacity GTSRB-RN34 and CIFAR10-RN34 models. The likely reason is that ResNet34 architecture has significant overcapacity for the primary task of classifying these datasets. Regularization cannot limit this capacity to an extent where the watermark would not be embedded. This means A needs sufficient knowledge of F V to select an appropriate model architecture for F A . It must have sufficient capacity to learn the primary classification task of the victim model while preventing watermark embedding. In model extraction attacks, A has black-box access to F V , which forces to use F A with sufficient capacity to maximize the attack success [8] . In this setting, regularization is not useful to circumvent DAWN.
Finally, while regularization can be useful, A needs relevant test data and ground truth to optimize the regularization parameters (e.g., decaying factor λ). Also, we observed in Fig. 3 that test accuracy is very unstable while the training 99% 89% 110 99% 90% 240 98% 89% CIFAR10-DN121 (DO=0.3) 99% 88% 160 98% 88% 210 97% 86% CIFAR10-DN121 (DO=0.5) 99% 85% 130 97% 88% 220 98% 87% CIFAR10-RN34 (λ = e −5 ) 100% 80% 10 100% 89% 160 97% 81% Caltech-RN34 97% 69% 110 93% 73% 160 94% 73% Caltech-DN121 (DO=0.3) 48% 44% 110 36% 59% 155 32% 57% Caltech-DN121 (DO=0.5) 35% 30% 115 22% 49% 185 21% 49% Caltech-RN34 (λ = 3e −4 ) 89% 67% 100 69% 68% 60 76% 68% loss remains constantly low when using regularization. A needs additional labeled test data to apply early stopping [32] of training at the optimal epoch providing maximal test accuracy. In all extraction attacks [6] - [10] the availability of relevant data is the main limitation. All this data is typically used for training the surrogate model and none is used for test purposes, which prevents optimization of regularization parameters and early stopping.
A third parameter that may impact watermark embedding is the distribution of watermarked inputs. In contrast to prior DNN watermarking solutions [3] - [5] , DAWN uses watermarked inputs from the same distribution as the training data. The watermark distribution cannot be controlled by A but we discuss its impact in Appendix B.
B. Detection of watermarked inputs
We assess if watermarked inputs can be identified such that A could remove them from the D A before training the surrogate model. A defense has been recently proposed to detect poisoned training data -aimed at backdoors embedded in DNN models [33] . Our watermark is a backdoor to a DNN model and this defense should be able to distinguish the trigger set T A from the rest of D A . This defense consists in first training a DNN model with the whole poisoned dataset. Then, training data is predicted using the trained model and we record the activations of the last hidden layer of the DNN model. These activations are projected to three dimensions using Independent Component Analysis (ICA) and clustered into two clusters using k-means. These clusters are expected to group benign training data and poisoned data (watermarked inputs) respectively. The intuition for this approach is that incorrectly labeled inputs (watermark) trigger different activations than correctly labeled inputs in the trained DNN model. The size and silhouette score [34] of the two clusters are analyzed to conclude (1) if there is backdoor in the model and (2) which training inputs compose the backdoor. According to authors, a low silhouette score (0.1/0.15) and a high difference in relative cluster size is expected if the model embeds a watermark. The smallest cluster should contain the watermarked inputs.
To evaluate this defense against DAWN, we trained two sets of DNN models, plain models using a correctly labeled training set only, and watermarked models each embedding a watermark of size |T A | = 250. We applied the watermark detection process discussed above on these models and report results in Tab. IV. Clustering is not able to isolate watermarked inputs into a single cluster; the main part of watermarked inputs belongs to large clusters. The recommendation [33] to discard small clusters from training would deprive D A from a large number of correctly labeled samples while a large part of the watermark would be preserved. The silhouette score is not useful for detecting the wateramrk either since watermarked and plain models have close scores that are all above the recommended detection threshold (0.1/0.15) [33] . Our plain models are detected as embedding a watermark using this defense. We conclude that this defense is ineffective at detecting watermarks generated by DAWN.
We assume the reason for this ineffectiveness is due to the nature of our watermark, selected from the same distribution as the training set. In contrast to prior DNN watermarking solutions [3] - [5] , our watermarked inputs do not come from a single manifold distant from the training data manifold. Consequently the model does not learn a "single" activation that generalizes to the whole watermark but rather learns individual exceptions for each watermarked input. The activations of watermarked inputs are thus different from each other and they are scattered among the activations of the remaining training data (correctly labeled). This can be observed in Fig. 4 -left, where we see that watermarked inputs are scattered among correctly labeled inputs. This explains why generated clusters cannot isolate watermarked inputs from correctly labeled inputs (Fig. 4 -right) .
VII. PROTECTING AGAINST MODEL EXTRACTION ATTACKS
We evaluate DAWN's effectiveness at watermarking surrogate DNN models constructed using extraction attacks. We demonstrate how to setup DAWN to protect a given victim model F V . We evaluate the successful embedding of watermarks in several surrogate models F A as well as their utility considering a circumvention strategy.
A. Model extraction attacks considered
We selected two model extraction attacks. The PRADA attack [7] achieves state-of-the-art performance in extracting low-capacity DNN models primarily using synthetic data. The KnockOff attack [8] extracts high-capacity DNN models using only natural data. PRADA is an iterative model extraction attack that consists of several duplication rounds. Each round is composed of three steps: 1 querying F V , 2 training F A with obtained predictions F V (x) and 3 crafting new synthetic queries using the updated F A . A first queries F V with natural queries called seed samples. Then, it crafts synthetic queries for which predictions are used to refine F A 's decision boundary. This means D A is built iteratively as F A is retrained and refined. PRADA uses prediction classesF V (x) to train F A .
We launch the PRADA attack against low-capacity models MNIST-5L, GTSRB-5L and CIFAR10-9L. Following the setup of Juuti et al. [7] , we use the same model architecture for both F V and F A , and F A is trained from scratch. We use 10 natural seed samples per class to attack MNIST-5L and GTSRB-5L, we perform 8 and 6 duplication rounds respectively, using respectively TRND and COLOR synthetic sample generation strategy. PRADA is not evaluated against CIFAR10-9L in prior work [7] . We use 1000 natural seed samples per class, 4 duplication rounds using TRND to train F A having a satisfactory accuracy. KnockOff is a model extraction attack to steal image classification DNN models. It queries natural image inputs coming from a distribution that is independent of the distribution of V's training set. All queries (D A ) and their predictions are used to retrain (fine-tune) a high-capacity pre-trained DNN model. Knockoff uses full probability vector F V (x) to retrain the surrogate model.
We launch the KnockOff attack against high-capacity models GTSRB-RN34, CIFAR10-RN34 and Caltech-RN34. Following the setup of Orekondy et al. [8] , we use ResNet34 architecture with ImageNet pre-trained weights as basis for F A . Then, F A is fine-tuned using 100,000 queries (D A ) sampled from the ImageNet dataset. For fine tuning, we use stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with momentum of 0.5 for 200 epochs. We chose an initial learning rate of 0.1 which is decayed every 60 epochs by a factor of 10.
The test accuracy of each surrogate model F A extracted with these respective attacks is reported in Tab. VI. These accuracy results are comparable to those obtained in prior work [7] , [8] . The surrogate models have an accuracy that is significantly lower (15-30 percentage points -pp) than their victim counterparts in all cases except for MNIST-5L and GTSRB-RN34. Model extraction attacks induce a decrease in the test accuracy of surrogate models [7] - [9] .
B. Watermarking decision and victim model utility
The watermarking decision function W V (x) requires defining the ratio r w of watermarked inputs. DAWN degrades F V utility by a factor equal to r w × Acc(F V ) due to incorrect predictions for watermarked inputs. The value of r w is specific to F V . Given a desired level of confidence for reliable ownership demonstration equal to 1 − P (L < e) (cf. Eq. 3), a tolerated error rate e and the number of classes m for F V , we can compute the minimum size for the watermark |T A | using Eq. 3. Given that V can estimate the minimum number of queries N required by A to train a usable surrogate model for F V , we can compute r w = N/|T A |. This ratio ensures that if A can successfully train a usable surrogate model F A , then F A will embed a watermark large enough to reliably demonstrate its ownership .
The probability for successful trivial watermark verification P (L < e) is valid for testing a single watermark. This probability increases by a factor equal to the number of tested watermarks. DAWN creates and registers client-specific watermarks. V must estimate the number of API clients to calculate the actual probability for trivial demonstration of ownership considering that all registered watermarks should be tested. When verifying a watermark, the judge J counts the number of registered watermarks for F V in the public bulletin. J computes the real probability for successful trivial watermark verification accordingly and decides if a demonstration of ownership is reliable or not according to this final confidence.
TABLE V: Ratio of watermarked inputs r w required to protect six victim models F V from extraction attack (PRADA for 3 first models / KnockOff for 3 last). Prediction API with 1M clients and targeted confidence for reliable demonstration of ownership = 1−2 −64 . Number of attack queries (N ) obtained from [7] , [8] and used to compute the watermark size |T A |. F V test accuracy decreases in a negligible manner (r w < 0.5%) that does not impact its utility. Suppose we want a confidence for reliable demonstration of ownership equal to 1 − 2 −64 . F V has a prediction API with 1M API clients (1M watermarks are registered for F V ). We need P (L < e) < 10 −6 × 2 −64 = 5.4 × 10 −26 to be able to test all registered watermarks while achieving our targeted confidence. We choose a tolerated error rate e = 0.5. Table V reports the computed watermark ratio r w required to protect six models against model extraction. We see r w must always be lower than 0.5% to reach 1 − 2 −64 confidence for any victim model. F V 's accuracy is thus degraded in a negligible manner that does not impact its utility. DAWN meets the reliability W2 and utility X1 requirements.
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C. Effectiveness against real extraction attacks
We want to show that any surrogate F A of a victim model F V protected by DAWN will embed a watermark that allows for reliable demonstration of ownership. We evaluate Low-capacity models expose a prediction API that returns prediction classesF V required for the PRADA attack. Highcapacity models return the full probability vector F V . Each victim model is protected by DAWN using the setting presented in Sect. VII-B. This setting enables V to demonstrate ownership of each surrogate model with confidence 1 − 2 −64 using a tolerated error rate e = 0.5. For demonstration of ownership to be successful, the surrogate model F A must pass the watermark verification test L(T A ,B V (T A ), F A ) < e. In our setting, it means that DAWN successfully defends against an extraction attack if the watermark accuracy for F A is larger than 50%, i.e., Acc wm (F A ) > 1 − e.
Table VI presents the result of this experiment. We see all surrogate models have a watermark accuracy Acc wm ≥ 66%, which means V is successful in demonstrating their ownership. DAWN successfully defends against the PRADA and KnockOff attacks for all tested models while incurring little decrease in F V 's utility (evaluated in Sect. VII-B). It is also worth noting that in all cases except for MNIST-5L, DAWN does not degrade the test accuracy of the surrogate F A .
D. Watermark removal with double extraction attack
We have shown DAWN effectively embeds a watermark in surrogate models F A stolen using extraction attacks. This watermark is difficult to remove during training (Sect. VI-A) and it is not detectable (Sect. VI-B). Nevertheless, the watermark can be removed by performing an extraction attack against F A to obtain a second order surrogate model F A . A has full control over F A which is not protected by DAWN. Consequently, the second order surrogate model F A extracted from F A would not embed the watermark and its ownership could not be demonstrated by V.
We observed in Tab. VI that surrogate models have a lower accuracy than victim models (15-30 percentage points lower in most cases). This is because model extraction incurs a necessary decrease in surrogate model accuracy. We evaluate the extent of this decrease if the adversary has to launch two successive extraction attacks instead of one to obtain F A deprived from watermark: the first against F V and the second against F A . We evaluate this evasion technique using the PRADA attack on the low-capacity models. We grant the adversary with the same capability (number of seed samples and API queries) as for a single extraction attack. A must use different queries for the two successive attacks because F A embeds the watermark and using same queries F A would also be trained using incorrect predictions for watermarked inputs. A uses half the seed samples for the first extraction attack, 5 per class for MNIST-5L and GTSRB-5L, 500 per class for CIFAR10-9L. The other half is used for the second attack. To query the same number of inputs, each attack is ran for one additional duplication round. The results of this experiment are reported in Tab. VII. The second extraction attack effectively removes the watermark from the second order surrogate model F A as depicted by the very low watermark accuracy (1-3%). Demonstration of ownership would fail against F A , which empirically confirms that prior DNN watermarking techniques are not resilient to model extraction attacks [5] . On the other hand, the test accuracy of the surrogate model decreases sharply during each extraction attack. The first attack is already less effective because A must divide D A in two to perform the two extraction attacks. The final test accuracy of F A is more than twice lower than that of F V , from -46pp to -66pp. Thus, we can consider Acc(F A ) Acc(F V ) making F A too inaccurate to be useful. This circumvention method is thus not effective for extracting a usable surrogate model with no watermark and DAWN meets W1.
VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Meeting system requirements Unremovability W1. We extensively evaluated (Sect VI-A) that manipulation of the training process of F A either does not prevent the embedding of the watermark or if it does, it significantly degrades F A 's test accuracy. Proper use of regularization can effectively mitigate the watermark embedding but it requires A to be granted more capabilities e.g. increased access to relevant data. We also showed (Sect. VII-D) that performing two successive extraction attacks completely removes watermarks from F A . However, it also decreases the test accuracy to an extent that makes F A unusable. Finally, prior work [3] - [5] has shown that manipulations after training such as pruning and adversarial fine tuning are ineffective against backdoor-based DNN watermarks. We can conclude that DAWN watermarking meets unremovability. Indistinguishability X2. We defined model-specific watermarking and backdoor functions (Sect. IV-A) that always return the same same output (correct or incorrect) for the same input. We also introduced a solution for mapping inputs with minor differences to similar predictions (Sect IV-A3). Finally, we empirically assessed (Sect. VI-B) that watermarks generated by DAWN are not detected by a recent defense against watermarking/backdooring. Hence, DAWN's watermarks are indistinguishable by API clients. Reliability W2 and utility X1. The watermark registration and verification protocol that we introduce (Sect. IV-D) ensures that the success of A in demonstrating ownership of an arbitrary model is negligible. We showed how to set up DAWN in order to reliably demonstrate ownership of several surrogate models stolen using two state-of-theart model extraction attacks with high confidence equal to 1 − 2 −64 (Sect. VII). DAWN effectively watermarked every surrogate model F A while causing a negligible decrease of F V 's utility (0.03-0.5%). DAWN allows for reliable ownership demonstration while preserving the utility. Non-ownership piracy W3 is guaranteed by our watermark registration and verification protocol (Sect. IV-D). In case of contention, the first registered model is deemed the original. Linkablity W4. DAWN selects watermarked inputs from API client queries and registers one watermark per API client. Different clients make different queries and they will consequently have different watermarks. Given that we meet the reliability requirement W2, a single watermark (T Ai , B V (T Ai )) will succeed in proving F Ai is a surrogate of F V . Watermarks are API client-specific which makes a surrogate model linkable to an API client. Collusion resistance X3. Distributing a model extraction attack across several API clients means several adversaries A i query a subset D Ai from the whole set D A used to train the surrogate model F A . The watermarking W V and backdoor B V functions are deterministic and specific to F V . Their results only depend on the input queried to F V . Thus, D A is labeled in the same manner and it includes the same trigger set T A whether it is queried by one or by multiple API clients. Thus, the watermark remains indistinguishable despite collusion X2. Also, the surrogate model F A trained using D A will embed the same unremovable watermark W1 regardless of collusion.
The difference is that each adversary A i has a subset T Ai of the whole trigger set T A . When verifying ownership, the judge J will have several successful watermark verification L(T Ai , B V (T Ai ), F A ) < e: one for each adversary A i who colluded to build the surrogate model F A . The verification of each sub-watermark (T Ai , B V (T Ai )) has the same expectation for success as the verification of the whole watermark (T A , B V (T A )). J will conclude that each API client i whose watermark is successfully verified is a perpetrator of the distributed extraction attack used to build the surrogate model F A . Linkability W4 remains valid in case of collusion.
B. Limitations
A can attempt to prevent ownership demonstration for F A by ensuring that watermark verification (Eq. 2) fails. This entails reducing the watermark accuracy by training F A using only a subset of the trigger set T A . Since watermarked inputs are indistinguishable (X2) and uniformly distributed in D A , A cannot selectively discard them. Nevertheless, A can discard x% of the whole D A , which statistically, will result in x% of watermarked input being discarded. This should reduce Acc wm (F A ) by 100 − x%. If x is high enough, the resulting Acc wm (F A ) can be brought down low enough for watermark verification to systematically fail.
While this strategy is effective, it deprives A from a large part of D A . This decreases the test accuracy and consequently the utility of F A , as we observed in Sect. VII-D. Alternatively, A must collect a set D A x% larger and make x% more queries to F V to compensate for later discarded training inputs. We already discussed in Sect II-B that access to relevant data is the main limitation for A. The secondary goal of A is to limit the number of queries to F V (cf. Sect. III-A). This evasion strategy requires more adversarial capabilities (access to data) and it compromises one adversary goal (minimum number of queries). Consequently, even if effective, we do not consider it a realistic evasion strategy.
IX. RELATED WORK
A. Watermarking DNN models
The IP of DNN models can be protected using watermarking. The first watermarking technique for DNNs [35] explicitly embeds additional information into the weights of a DNN after it is trained. Verifying the watermark requires white-box access to the model in order to analyze the weights. A limitation of this approach is that the watermark can be easily removed by minimally retraining the watermarked model.
Alternative approaches [3] - [5] , [14] that are more robust have been proposed, where the watermark can be verified in a black-box setting. These are based on backdooring and they allow for watermark extraction using only a prediction API, as discussed in Sect. II-C. These approaches use both a carefully selected trigger set and a specific training process chosen by the model owner. The first proposal for such approach [3] consist in modifying the original model boundary using adversarial retraining [36] in order to make the model unique. The watermark is composed of synthetically generated adversarial samples [19] that are close to the decision boundary. The impact of selecting a particular distribution for a watermark has been evaluated in [5] . It shows that selecting a trigger set from the same distribution as the training data (albeit with minor synthetic modifications) or from a different distribution, does not affect the accuracy of the model for its primary classification task or on its training time, while the watermark gets perfectly embedded. Finally, more formal foundations and theoretical guarantees for backdoor-based DNN watermarking have been provided in [4] . This work empirically assesses that the removability of a DNN watermark is highly dependent on the training process of the watermarked model (training from scratch vs. re-training).
In contrast to prior DNN watermarking techniques for black-box verification [3] - [5] , [14] , DAWN considers a victim who (a) does not control the training of the DNN model and (b) cannot select a trigger set T from the whole input space R n . DAWN dynamically embeds a watermark in queries made to a model prediction API. Thus, DAWN defends against model extraction attacks and enables a model owner to identify surrogates of its model. In contrast, all prior DNN watermarking solutions are vulnerable to model extraction.
B. Defenses against model extraction
Several methods have been developed to detect and/or prevent model extraction attacks. Notably, it was suggested that the distribution of queries made during an extraction attack is different from benign queries [7] . Hence, model extraction can be detected using density estimation methods, namely by assessing the ability for queries to fit a Gaussian distribution or not. However, this technique protects only against attacks using synthetic queries and is not effective against, e.g., the KnockOff attack. Other detection methods analyse subsequent queries close to the classes' decision boundaries [37] or queries exploring abnormally large region of the input space [38] . Both methods are effective but detect only extraction attacks against decision trees. They are ineffective against complex models like DNNs.
It was proposed that altering predictions returned to API clients can mitigate model extraction attacks. Predictions can be restricted to classes [6] or adversarially modified to degrade the performance of the surrogate model [39] . However, some extraction attacks [7] circumvent such defenses because they remain effective using just prediction classes. Prior defenses to model extraction are designed to protect only simple models [37] , [38] or to prevent only specific extraction attacks [39] . It is arguable if a generic defense would ever be effective at detecting/preventing model extraction. Consequently, with DAWN we take a different approach where we assume a surrogate model can be extracted. Then we propose a generic defense to identify surrogate DNN models that have been extracted from any victim model using any extraction attack. 
